Ekonomi Manajerial dalam Perekonomian Global

Bab 10:

Teori Pertandingan dan Tingkahlaku Stratregis

Bahan Kuliah

Program Pascasarjana-UHAMKA

Program Studi Magister Manajemen

Dosen: Dr. Muchdie, PhD in Economics Jam Konsultasi: Sabtu, 10.00-12.00

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Tingkah laku Strategis

- Keputusan-keputusan yang mempertimbangkan reaksi pesaing (yang dapat diprediksi)
 - Interdependence of outcomes
- Teori Pertandingan
 - Pemain (Players)
 - Strategi (Strategies)
 - Matrik hasil (Payoff matrix)

Tingkah laku Strategis

- Tipe Pertandingan (Types of Games)
 - Zero-sum games
 - Nonzero-sum games
- Keseimbangan Nash (Nash-Equilibrium)
 - Setiap pemain memilih strategi optimal tergantung pada strategi lawan
 - Suatu strategi disebut dominan jika strategi tersebut optimal apapun stategi yang dimainkan oleh lawannya.

		Firm B	
		Advertise Don't Advert	
Firm A	Advertise	(4, 3)	(5, 1)
IIIIIA	Don't Advertise	(2, 5)	(3, 2)

What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses to advertise?

		Firm B		
		Advertise	Don't Advertise	
Firm A	Advertise	(4, 3)	(5, 1)	
FIIIIA	Don't Advertise	(2, 5)	(3, 2)	

What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses to advertise?

If Firm A chooses to advertise, the payoff is 4. Otherwise, the payoff is 2. The optimal strategy is to advertise.

		Firm B			
		Ac	dverti	se	Don't Advertise
Firm A	Advertise	((4, 3)		(5, 1)
	Don't Advertise		(2, 5)		(3, 2)

What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses not to advertise?

		Firm B		
		Advertise		Don't Advertise
Firm A	Advertise	(4, 3)		(5, 1)
FIIIIA	Don't Advertise	(2, 5)		(3, 2)

What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses not to advertise?

If Firm A chooses to advertise, the payoff is 5. Otherwise, the payoff is 3. Again, the optimal strategy is to advertise.

		Firm B			
		Advertise		Don't Adve	ertise
Firm A	Advertise	(4, 3)		((5, 1)	
	Don't Advertise	(2, 5)		(3, 2)	

Regardless of what Firm B decides to do, the optimal strategy for Firm A is to advertise. The <u>dominant strategy</u> for Firm A is to advertise.

		Firm B	
		Advertise Don't Adve	
Firm A	Advertise	((4, 3))	((5, 1))
	Don't Advertise	(2, 5)	(3, 2)

What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses to advertise?

		Firm B	
		Advertise Don't Advert	
Firm A	Advertise	(4, 3)	(5, 1)
	Don't Advertise	(2, 5)	(3, 2)

What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses to advertise?

If Firm B chooses to advertise, the payoff is 3. Otherwise, the payoff is 1. The optimal strategy is to advertise.

		Firm B	
		Advertise Don't Adver	
Firm A	Advertise	(4, 3)	(5, 1)
FIIIII A	Don't Advertise	(2, 5)	(3, 2)

What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses not to advertise?

		Firm B	
		Advertise Don't Adve	
Firm A	Advertise	(4, 3)	(5, 1)
ГШПА	Don't Advertise	(2, 5)	(3, 2)

What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses not to advertise?

If Firm B chooses to advertise, the payoff is 5. Otherwise, the payoff is 2. Again, the optimal strategy is to advertise.

		Firm B	
		Advertise Don't Advert	
Firm A	Advertise	(4, 3)	(5, 1)
ГШПА	Don't Advertise	((2, 5))	(3, 2)

Regardless of what Firm A decides to do, the optimal strategy for Firm B is to advertise. The <u>dominant strategy</u> for Firm B is to advertise.

		Firm B	
		Advertise Don't Advert	
Firm A	Advertise	((4, 3))	(5, 1)
IIIIIA	Don't Advertise	<u>((2, 5))</u>	(3, 2)

The dominant strategy for Firm A is to advertise and the dominant strategy for Firm B is to advertise. The <u>Nash</u> equilibrium is for both firms to advertise.

		Firm B	
		Advertise Don't Advert	
Firm A	Advertise	((4, 3))	(5, 1)
FIIIIA	Don't Advertise	(2, 5)	(3, 2)

		Firm B	
		Advertise	Don't Advertise
Firm A	Advertise	(4, 3)	(5, 1)
	Don't Advertise	(2, 5)	(6, 2)

What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses to advertise?

		Firm B	
		Advertise	Don't Advertise
Firm A	Advertise	(4, 3)	(5, 1)
	Don't Advertise	(2, 5)	(6, 2)

What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses to advertise?

If Firm A chooses to advertise, the payoff is 4. Otherwise, the payoff is 2. The optimal strategy is to advertise.

	[Firm B			
		Ac	dverti	se	Don't Advertise
Firm A	Advertise		(4, 3)		(5, 1)
	Don't Advertise		(2, 5)		(6, 2)

What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses not to advertise?

		Firm B		
		Advertise		Don't Advertise
Firm A	Advertise	(4, 3)		(5, 1)
FIIIIA	Don't Advertise	(2, 5)		(6, 2)

What is the optimal strategy for Firm A if Firm B chooses not to advertise?

If Firm A chooses to advertise, the payoff is 5. Otherwise, the payoff is 6. In this case, the optimal strategy is <u>not</u> to advertise.

		Firm B			
		Advertise	Do	n't Adver	tise
Firm A	Advertise	(4, 3)		((5, 1))	
ГШПА	Don't Advertise	(2, 5)		(6, 2)	

The optimal strategy for Firm A depends on which strategy is chosen by Firms B. Firm A does not have a dominant strategy.

		Firm B	
_		Advertise	Don't Advertise
Firm A	Advertise	(4, 3)	(5, 1)
ГШПА	Don't Advertise	(2, 5)	((6, 2))

What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses to advertise?

		Firm B	
		Advertise	Don't Advertise
Firm A	Advertise	(4, 3)	(5, 1)
	Don't Advertise	(2, 5)	(6, 2)

What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses to advertise?

If Firm B chooses to advertise, the payoff is 3. Otherwise, the payoff is 1. The optimal strategy is to advertise.

		Firm B	
		Advertise	Don't Advertise
Firm A	Advertise	((4, 3))	(5, 1)
ГШПА	Don't Advertise	(2, 5)	(6, 2)

What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses not to advertise?

		Firm B	
		Advertise	Don't Advertise
Firm A	Advertise	(4, 3)	(5, 1)
ГШПА	Don't Advertise	(2, 5)	(6, 2)

What is the optimal strategy for Firm B if Firm A chooses not to advertise?

If Firm B chooses to advertise, the payoff is 5. Otherwise, the payoff is 2. Again, the optimal strategy is to advertise.

		Firm B	
		Advertise	Don't Advertise
Firm A	Advertise	(4, 3)	(5, 1)
ГШПА	Don't Advertise	((2, 5))	(6, 2)

Regardless of what Firm A decides to do, the optimal strategy for Firm B is to advertise. The <u>dominant strategy</u> for Firm B is to advertise.

		Firm B	
		Advertise Don't Adve	
Firm A	Advertise	((4, 3))	(5, 1)
FIIIII A	Don't Advertise	((2, 5))	(6, 2)

The dominant strategy for Firm B is to advertise. If Firm B chooses to advertise, then the optimal strategy for Firm A is to advertise. The <u>Nash equilibrium</u> is for both firms to advertise.

	[Firm B	
		Advertise Don't Adve	
Firm A	Advertise	(4, 3)	(5, 1)
	Don't Advertise	(2, 5)	(3, 2)

Dua tersangka ditahan karena perampokan bersenjata. Mereka ditahan secara terpisah. Jika terbukti, mereka akan dipenjara masing-masing 10 tahun. Tetapi bukti-bukti tidak cukup kecuali sebagai pencurian biasa yang hanya bisa memenjarakan 1 tahun saja.

Tersangka diberitahu: Jika mengaku, tetapi temannya tidak mengaku dia akan bebas. Tetapi jika tidak mengaku, sementara temannya mengaku, temannya akan bebas dan dia dapat 10 tahun. Jika kedua-duanya mengaku, maka mereka masing-masing akan kena 5 tahun.

Payoff Matrix (negative values)

		Individual B	
		Confess	Don't Confess
Individual A	Confess	(5, 5)	(0, 10)
iliuividuai A	Don't Confess	(10, 0)	(1, 1)

Dominant Strategy
Both Individuals Confess

(Nash Equilibrium)

		Individual B	
		Confess	Don't Confess
Individual A	Confess	((5, 5))	(0, 10)
Iliulviuuai A	Don't Confess	(1 0, 0)	(1, 1)

Application: Price Competition

		Firm B	
		Low Price	High Price
Firm A	Low Price	(2, 2)	(5, 1)
	High Price	(1, 5)	(3, 3)

Application: Price Competition

Dominant Strategy: Low Price

		Firm B	
		Low Price	High Price
Firm A	Low Price	((2, 2))	(5, 1)
	High Price	(1, 5)	(3, 3)

Application: Nonprice Competition

		Firm B	
		Advertise	Don't Advertise
Firm A	Advertise	(2, 2)	(5, 1)
	Don't Advertise	(1, 5)	(3, 3)

Application: Nonprice Competition

Dominant Strategy: Advertise

		Firm B	
		Advertise	Don't Advertise
Firm A	Advertise	((2, 2))	(5, 1)
	Don't Advertise	(1, 5)	(3, 3)

Application: Cartel Cheating

		Firm B	
		Cheat	Don't Cheat
Firm A	Cheat	(2, 2)	(5, 1)
	Don't Cheat	(1, 5)	(3, 3)

Application: Cartel Cheating

Dominant Strategy: Cheat

		Firm B	
		Cheat	Don't Cheat
Firm A	Cheat	((2, 2))	(5, 1)
	Don't Cheat	(1, 5)	(3, 3)

Perluasan Teori Pertandingan

- Repeated Games
 - Many consecutive moves and countermoves by each player
- Tit-For-Tat Strategy
 - Do to your opponent what your opponent has just done to you

Perluasan Teori Pertandingan

- Tit-For-Tat Strategy
 - Stable set of players
 - Small number of players
 - Easy detection of cheating
 - Stable demand and cost conditions
 - Game repeated a large and uncertain number of times

Perluasan Teori Pertandingan

- Threat Strategies
 - Credibility
 - Reputation
 - Commitment
 - Example: Entry deterrence